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BOOK REVIEW
THANKS FOR THE MEMORIES: CRIMINAL LAW
AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MEMORY
Victor BaraU"
ONCE UPON A TIME: A TRUE STORY OF MEMORY, MURDER, AND
THE LAW, Harry N. MacLean, New York: HarperCollins (1993).
485 pp.
On September 22, 1969, Susan Nason, a nine-year-old girl
living in Foster City, California, disappeared.' She had come
home from school that day, greeted her mother and immediate-
ly gone back out to run an errand, which she completed by
around 3:15 p.m.2 She was not seen thereafter until December
2, 1969, when her decomposed body was discovered beneath an
old boxspring in a wooded area not far from Foster City, a
conservative, middle-class community of 12,000 in San Mateo
County.3 The conventional wisdom in Foster City was that the
killer must have come from Oakland or San Francisco, the
scarlet cities not far to the north, but the man ultimately ar-
rested and charged with the murder, George Franklin, in fact
had lived in Foster City in 1969.
* Senior Appellate Attorney, Office of the District Attorney of Kings County,
Brooklyn, New York; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1977; J.D., Temple Univer-
sity, 1983. The opinions expressed in this book review are the author's, not the
Office's.
I HARRY N. MAcLEAN, ONCE UPON A TIME: A TRUE STORY OF MEMORY, MUR-
DER, AND THE LAW 13-16 (1993).
2 Id.
' Id. at 10-11, 24-27.
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That George Franklin might have been the killer certainly
made sense to those people who knew him well, for George
Franklin was, to put it quite accurately, a monstrous individu-
al. All five of his children had spent their childhoods being
physically brutalized and/or sexually abused by him.4 Further-
more, he had an unquenchable sexual appetite, and a particu-
lar fascination for young girls, whose images figured promi-
nently in his pornography collection.5 But none of these facts
proved anything, absent some evidence connecting Franklin
with the murder itself. That evidence did not materialize until
some twenty years after the murder, when, in November 1989,
Franklin's daughter, Eileen, came forward. In a telephone call
to the San Mateo County District Attorney's Office, Eileen
Franklin revealed that she had been present when, in a seclud-
ed area outside town, her father had raped her best friend,
Susan Nason, in the back seat of his van, and crushed Susan's
skull with a rock.6
In the annals of criminal law, there must be countless
instances of persons who, out of fear, love, apathy or any num-
ber of other motives fail to report crimes they have witnessed
until long after, living, in the meanwhile, with their memories
more or less intact. Were Eileen Franklin just one more such
person, Once Upon A Time, an interesting and timely book,
presumably would not have been written. But Eileen Franklin
was not someone who lived with her memories intact and final-
ly gave in to the demands of conscience. For twenty years,
Eileen Franklin simply had no recollection of what she had
observed; her memories of the murder, she claimed, had been
completely repressed and had re-emerged only shortly before
her telephone call to the authorities.
The phenomenon of repressed memory, long the bread-
and-butter of psychoanalysis, increasingly has become a part of
the diet of the courts as well. Tort actions based on childhood
sexual abuse-brought by adult plaintiffs whose long-repressed
memories suddenly have become accessible-nowadays are
becoming practically commonplace.7 Criminal actions, too, as
Id. at 252-56.
Id. at 172, 252-56.
6 Id. at 5-7.
1 See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Evans v.
Eckelman, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Lemmerman v. Fealk, 507
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evidenced by the prosecution of George Franklin, are no longer
considered off-limits by district attorneys' offices.' Sometimes
the "facts" ultimately remembered, years later, by the putative
victims of childhood trauma are bizarre and improbable;9 even
when that is not the case, the mental processes themselves,
whereby memories are lost and found, challenge the under-
standing of even the most sophisticated of jurors. Consequent-
ly, in cases involving issues of repressed memory, the parties
typically will want to present the testimony of psychiatric
experts.
Harry N. MacLean's Once Upon A Time is an intelligent
and exhaustive study of the successful prosecution of George
Franklin. With a novelist's skill, Mr. MacLean perceptively
describes both the hostile milieu with which George Franklin
had to contend growing up, and the violent and capricious
N.W.2d 226 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986). In
Lemmerman, for example, the fifty-four-year-old plaintiff alleged that she had been
sexually abused by her father and aunt from the age of three until puberty and
that she had repressed the memories of the abuse for some forty-odd years. The
memories returned spontaneously and were fleshed out as a result of therapy. The
Michigan Court of Appeals, invoking the so-called "discovery rule," held that the
plaintiffs claims were not barred by the two- and three-year statutes of limitation
applicable to her causes of action. Lemmerman, 507 N.W.2d at 552.
' See also Lawrence Wright, Remembering Satan, NEW YORKER, May 17, 1993,
at 60; Id., May 24, 1993, at 54.
' Id. Wright, supra note 8, describes a criminal investigation in Olympia,
Washington arising out of a young woman's "recollection" during a sort of group
therapy exercise that she had been abused by her father. Soon after, her siblings
were also recalling abuse by the father, an employee of the county sheriffs office,
as well as by the father's friends, including other law enforcement officials. Ulti-
mately, the children were recalling Satanic rituals in the woods, involving the
sacrifice of human babies. Most bizarre of all, the father, with a little prodding,
also came to remember these incidents, and pleaded guilty to some of them. As
Wright makes clear, however, in all probability, none of these things ever hap-
pened.
Although they do not involve long-term repressed memories, a number of
prosecutions of child-care workers, based on the uncorroborated accusations of the
children in their care, involve equally peculiar allegations, and raise the question
of whether the children actually remember what they ultimately report, or wheth-
er they are adopting the suggestions of investigators. See, e.g., Joseph F. Sullivan,
Woman May Face Retrial in Child-Center Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1993, at
B5 (child care worker was accused of inserting a variety of foreign objects into
children's anuses and vaginas; making children lick peanut butter and jelly from
each other's bodies; forcing children to eat her feces; and playing Jingle Bells on
the piano while naked, all of these acts allegedly having been committed in one
room of a day care center having numerous other employees who could have
walked in at any time).
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environment he went on to create for his own children-an
environment that left every one of his children, including
Eileen herself, with serious psychological scars. Thereafter, the
author narrates in comprehensive detail the renewed investi-
gation of the crime and the unfolding of the trial itself. Mr.
MacLean, an attorney himself, is particularly effective in ex-
plaining the litigants' respective strategies and the court's
evidentiary rulings, in analyzing the strengths and weaknesses
of each witness's testimony, and in demonstrating the critical
importance of expert psychiatric testimony in propping up the
otherwise far-from-persuasive testimony of Eileen Franklin
regarding her ancient memories and how they returned. The
author makes clear that, in the "battle of the experts," the
prosecution did not win by presenting a more knowledgeable
witness, but by presenting a more charming, personable wit-
ness-a witness who knew how to communicate with a jury.
Although the author does not say whether he believes
George Franklin was guilty, after reading Once Upon A Time,
one cannot help but wonder, at least, whether his guilt was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. More importantly, however,
Mr. MacLean's book raises important questions concerning the
wisdom of relying on "memory" experts in the search for histor-
ical truth, particularly when the life or liberty of a criminal
defendant is at stake.
I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REPRESSED MEMORY
In psychoanalytic theory, "repression" refers to the process
by which the mind conceals traumatic material from itself
within the "unconscious." If forgetting involves a failure of the
"storage mechanism" of the mind, repression theoretically
involves something different; the repressed material does not
cease to exist in the mind, it merely becomes inaccessible, and,
under ordinary circumstances, it cannot be called up to con-
sciousness in the same manner and with the same ease as
other remembered information." Repressed material may re-
1 In psychoanalytic terminology, the "preconscious" is that part of the mind in
which are stored those memories that can easily be retrieved into consciousness.
The "unconscious," by contrast, is the storehouse of ordinarily inaccessible memo-
ries. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALY-
sis 87-90 (1989).
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turn to consciousness, however, through hypnosis or the work
of psychotherapy, or may occasionally return spontaneously
triggered, for example, by a present sensation." Moreover,
psychoanalytic theory posits that repressed material may man-
ifest itself symbolically in present-day neurotic symptoms, such
as psychosomatic ailments or repetitive/compulsive behavior.
Thus, "[tihe patient... is obliged to repeat the repressed mate-
rial as contemporary experience, instead of remembering it as
something belonging to the past."2
"Repression is universal in human beings," the neurologist
Oliver Sacks has recently observed, and there are few students
of the human mind who today would challenge the accuracy of
this observation."3 However, there is considerable disagree-
ment in the psychiatric community about the nature of the
traumatic material that we repress. There are those who be-
lieve that the subject matter of repressed memory is actual,
historical experience-that we repress the recollection of
events too painful to bear. On the other hand, there are those
who believe that, although some of what we repress may relate
to historical experience, most of what we repress is our own
mental life; that is, we repress wishes, fantasies and desires
which, if addressed on a conscious level, would be too painful
to bear. These differences in outlook are as old as psychoanaly-
sis itself and derive, in fact, from successive strands in Freud's
own thinking on the subject of repression. 4
When Freud began administering the "talking cure" in the
mid-1890s, he believed what his patients told him. Having
previously postulated that the root cause of neurosis was the
repression of material that was sexual in nature, he now had
his "proof:" his patients, mostly young women from the Vien-
11 The most famous literary example of the spontaneous return of buried mem-
ories is in Marcel Prousfs Swann's Way, in which the narrator, in the course of
dipping a madeleine into a cup of tea, suddenly remembers the entire world of his
childhood. See MARCEL PROUST, SWANN'S WAY 48 (C.K. Scott-Moncrieffet et al.
trans., 1989).
" MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 237 (quoting an unspecified article by Freud)
(emphasis in original).
3 Oliver Sacks, A Neurologist's Notebook, NEW YORKER, Dec. 27, 1993, at 122.
Dr. Sacks allows that there may be certain individuals who do not repress as a
result of organic brain damage, but considers such cases so exceptional as to prove
the rule. Id. at 122-23.
" MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 237.
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nese middle class, began remembering that they had been
sexually abused or "seduced" as children, most often by their
fathers or other adults close to them. 5 Accordingly, Freud
concluded, neurosis was the ultimate result of the repression of
these actual, traumatic experiences. 6 Before long, howev-
er, the frequency of these reports of abuse stretched Freud's
credulity beyond the breaking point. He concluded that it was
not possible that such terrible goings-on could be going on in so
many good, bourgeois households. "Almost all my women pa-
tients told me that they had been seduced by their father,"
Freud was to write,17 and the evidence, to his mind, simply
proved too much. 8 Some time in 1897, Freud abandoned his
"seduction theory" and replaced it with another.
Psychoanalysis came into existence when Freud reinterpreted the
very same clinical data to indicate that it must have been his pa-
tients themselves, when scarcely out of the cradle, who had predis-
posed themselves to neurosis by harboring and then repressing in-
cestuous designs of their own. Every later development of psychoan-
alytic theory would crucially rely on this root hypothesis. 9
Thus, Freud's thinking shifted from a fundamental belief in
the historical reality of repressed memories to a fundamental
disbelief.
As Mr. MacLean points out, American psychiatry, domi-
nated for most of the century by Freudian theory, largely dis-
counted the effect of actual traumatic experience on the devel-
opment of the psyche.2° But in the last couple of decades there
has been a shift back in the other direction, i.e., to the view
that Freud had it right in the first place. One reason for this
shift, Mr. MacLean argues, was the Vietnam War; the thou-
sands of veterans who, without a doubt, had undergone ex-
tremely traumatic experiences, and who continued, in peace-
" See PETER GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 90-96 (1988).
16 This original formulation of Freud's goes by the name of the "seduction theo-
ry." Id.
17 Frederick Crews, The Unknown Freud, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 18, 1993, at
61 (citing FREUD, supra note 10, at 149).
1 "I was driven to recognize in the end that these reports were untrue and so
came to understand that hysterical symptoms are derived from phantasies and not
from real occurrences." FREUD, supra note 10, at 149; see also GAY, supra note 15,
at 90-96.
1' Crews, supra note 17, at 61.
20 MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 237.
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time, to suffer the psychological after-effects of those experienc-
es, constituted a significant challenge to old theory.21
Of greater importance yet has been the impact of feminism
on psychoanalytic thinking. Although Freud may have been a
visionary, that could not prevent him from absorbing the patri-
archal values of his era. One does not have to read much of
Freud to realize that he thought women were morally and
intellectually inferior to men." Ultimately, it has been ar-
gued, Freud suffered a "failure of nerve" when it came to lis-
tening to his women patients;" culturally, he was predisposed
not to believe their reports of sexual abuse, and he failed to
overcome his predispositions. Or, to put the matter more
charitably, we may say that although Freud thought that he
had been naive in originally crediting the repressed memories
of his patients, in fact he was naive in ultimately concluding
that childhood sexual trauma was rare.
In any event, if, for these and other reasons, psychologists
nowadays are not so skeptical as Freud, neither can it be said
that they uncritically accept the reliability of recovered memo-
ries concerning traumatic events remote in time. After all, as
we all know, even "normal" memories-memories that have not
undergone the process of repression-may fade over time, or,
alternatively, may be transformed by present ideas of what
"must have happened." As a result, gaps in memory may be
filled by logic or self-interest, and we eventually may become
unable to distinguish between the kernel of actual memory and
our extrapolations from it. And we even may come to believe
21 Id.
See, e.g., FREUD, supra note 10, at 139-68.
Crews, supra note 17, at 61.
24 Perhaps the most notorious example of Freud's failure in this regard can be
found in his case history of a patient he called Dora. See SIGMUND FREUD, DORA:
AN ANALYSIS OF A CASE OF HYSTERIA (P. Rieff ed., 1993). Dora was brought to
Freud by her father, who hoped for a cure to his eighteen-year-old daughter's hys-
terical symptoms. Freud soon learned from the girl that her father was having an
affair with the wife of a family friend, Herr K.; that Herr K. was crudely pressing
his attentions on Dora, as he had done several years earlier; and that Dora's
father viewed Herr K.'s attentions not with alarm but as convenient to his own
purposes. Freud did not discredit this information, but rather than taking the
girl's side in the matter and attributing her problems to this untenable situation,
he instead attempted to persuade her that her various symptoms derived from her
failure to acknowledge her own sexual feelings for Herr K. See GAY, supra note
15, at 246-55; Crews, supra note 17, at 59-60.
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that we truly remember events that we only have heard
about.25
There is no reason to believe that repressed memories are
any less susceptible to the processes of decay and falsification
than "normal" memories. Indeed, it is arguable that persons
who have no present recollection of alleged events in the re-
mote past may be particularly vulnerable to suggestion by
others, such as psychotherapists or trusted friends, that such
events actually occurred, and may come to "remember" accord-
ingly.26 Thus, recovered memories, too, may contain the whole
truth, a kernel of truth or no truth at all. As Mr. MacLean
succinctly puts it, "The experts in this field don't deny there
are both true traumatic memories and false traumatic memo-
ries. What they don't agree on is how to tell one from the oth-
er, or whether that is even possible."27 This necessarily
prompts one to ask: How useful are such experts in a court of
law?
'The renowned Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget wrote of his own experience
with the ability of the mind to create a false memory. He remembered
and talked about for years an incident in which a man tried to kidnap
him at age two from his pram in the presence of his nurse. When Piaget
was fifteen, his nurse returned to his parents and confessed that the
story was false, there never had been an attempted abduction, and that
she had made up the incident in order to win their approval. Piaget had
heard the incident recounted from his earliest consciousness and had in-
corporated the details into a visual memory which he believed to be real
and recounted as factual for years.
MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 239-40.
" See Susan Chira, Sexual Abuse: The Coil of Truth and Memory, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1993, at D3:
A number of psychiatrists . . . say that in the hands of an incompetent
or ideologically driven therapist, a patient might easily confuse dreams
with memories, unconsciously building long-held resentments into a case
of forgotten molestation. "Maybe an account is wrong in literal fact,"
Professor Haaken [a psychologist] said, "but maybe it describes something
very deep about her experience in the family and in the culture."
Crews, supra note 17, at 61-62, argues that Freud himself was just such an in-
competent therapist, and that his "seduction theory" only came into being as a
result of his overbearing suggestions to his patients about what they had experi-
enced or witnessed. See also Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1993, at
A6 (reporting on demonstrably false claims of sexual abuse and a psycho-
therapist's role in having elicited the false memories).
2 MAcLEAN, supra note 1, at 240.
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II. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND REPRESSED MEMORY
For expert testimony to be admitted at trial, two require-
ments must be satisfied. First, the specialized knowledge to be
imparted by the expert must be such as would assist the trier
of fact and, second, the specialized knowledge must satisfy
some standard of scientific validity.2" Thus, the first require-
ment focuses on the jury, i.e., whether it could use help, while
the second requirement focuses on the expert, i.e., whether
information that he or she could supply would help the jury
discern the truth. The admission of expert testimony on the
subject of repressed memory is problematic on both scores.
As the world continues to become a more complicated place
and, accordingly, defies the efforts at comprehension of even
the most conscientious individuals, more and more cases can
be expected to involve the testimony of experts. However that
may be, the credibility and reliability of witnesses are matters
that traditionally have been considered exclusively within the
province of the trier of fact. Consequently, courts usually have
held, and continue to hold, that proposed expert testimony that
would impinge on these jury prerogatives would not be help-
ful." This judicial reluctance obviously stems from the view
" See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993); People v. Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d 430, 432, 158 N.E.2d
351, 352, 470 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (1983).
' See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 632 (5th Cir. 1982) (prob-
lems of perception and memory can be adequately addressed through cross-exami-
nation); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976) (rejecting
proposed testimony on reliability of eyewitness identification as a usurpation of the
jury's function); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 169 n.16 (8th Cir. 1975)
(polygraph evidence not necessary since jury is capable of performing the function
served by the polygraph); Robertson v. McCloskey, 676 F. Supp. 351, 353-54
(D.D.C. 1988) (rejecting proposed expert testimony on the processes of memory;
subject is within comprehension of the average juror); People v. Foulks, 143
A.D.2d 1038, 1039, 533 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (2d Dep't 1988) (expert testimony on
reliability of eyewitness identification "is not a proper subject for expert testimony,
since it pertains to matters of common knowledge not beyond the ken of lay ju-
rors"); Utah v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982) (proposed testimony on
reliability of eyewitness identification would "amount to a lecture to the jury about
how they should perform their duties"); see also Iowa v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91,
97-98 (Iowa 1986) (expert testimony based on studies showing that children tend
to be truthful erroneously admitted); Pennsylvania v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920, 922
(Pa. 1986) (whether a witness is truthful is a question to be answered on basis of
"ordinary experiences of life and common knowledge as to the natural tendencies
of human nature, as well as upon observations of the demeanor and character of
1994]
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that average citizens, collectively applying their common sense
and worldly experience, can figure out not only whether a
person is being honest, but also, whether an honest person's
perceptions are accurate reflections of external reality. This
pragmatic faith in the common man, however admirable politi-
cally, is psychologically naive. It is frequently difficult to know
when someone is lying: the proverbial sweaty palms and avert-
ed gaze may be more indicative of language difficulties, cultur-
al differences in etiquette or stowage than of fabrication; con-
versely, skillful liars or well-rehearsed witnesses may pass all
the traditional demeanor tests."° Similarly, the average per-
son does not know enough about the effects of stress, for exam-
ple, to determine whether stress enhances or impairs the reli-
ability of perceptions. 1 These considerations suggest that
courts should be less quick to assume that expert testimony
touching on matters of credibility and perception would not be
of assistance to a lay jury. For example, expert testimony con-
cerning the untrustworthiness of eyewitness identifications,
routinely excluded in many jurisdictions as an unacceptable
invasion of the jury's functions, 2 perhaps should not be
viewed with such a "distinct distaste"33-- particularly given
the Supreme Court's recognition that suggestive identifications
account for more miscarriages of justice than any other fac-
tor. 4
Courts, however, have modified their stance on what
would be of assistance to a jury when the proffered expert
testimony is thought to run completely counter to the conven-
the witness"); Yount v. Texas, No. 617-91, 1993 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 192, at *7
(Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 1993) (expert may not give an opinion that complainant
in sexual abuse case, or class of persons to which complainant belongs, is truth-
ful).
30 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206 n.22 (4th ed. 1992).
3' Thus, defense attorneys in one-witness identification cases typically argue
that the crime victim was too frightened to have formed a clear picture of the
perpetrator; prosecutors typically respond that during the few seconds it took for
the incident to transpire, the face of the perpetrator became deeply and perma-
nently etched in the victim's brain.
It should be noted, as well, that at least some evidentiary rules-such as the
hearsay exceptions for excited utterances and dying declarations-are logical but
not necessarily psycho-logical.
32 See supra note 29. See generally 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 206A.
1 MCCORMICK, supra note 30, at 904.
3" See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967).
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tional wisdom as to witness credibility. For example, studies
have found that some rape victims initially react calmly to
having been attacked or blame themselves and, accordingly,
fail to report the crime. Owing to "common misperceptions"
and "cultural myths" about rape, lay juries, lacking assistance,
might conclude that these responses are inconsistent with
rape, and might be inclined to discredit the complainant's
testimony. Expert testimony on "rape trauma syndrome,"
therefore, has generally been accepted as admissible in recent
years, as such testimony imparts to the jury information that
otherwise might be counterintuitive.35
Expert testimony on "normal" memory processes may
justifiably be rejected as within the comprehension of the aver-
age juror for, as the district court observed in Robertson v.
McCloskey,36 "It is no secret that memory decreases over time,
that individuals can selectively remember or even fabricate
events, or that stress can have an impact on memory or per-
ception."37 These matters, therefore, usually can be dealt with
adequately through cross-examination. By contrast, recovered
memory is not a phenomenon with which the average juror
necessarily can be expected to be familiar. The idea that a
person could suddenly remember, years later, a vivid occur-
rence that theretofore had never entered his or her conscious-
ness may well strike the lay juror as completely preposterous,
or indicative of pure insanity. Accordingly, although expert
testimony on this subject does relate to matters of credibility
and reliability, such testimony should not, for that reason, be
rejected.
But to say that the jury could use assistance is not to say
that an expert witness would necessarily be of assistance, and
it is this latter requirement that presents the greater difficulty
" See People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 289, 292, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136, 138,
552 N.Y.2d 883, 888, 890 (1990) (citing several cases on the admissibility of testi-
mony on "rape trauma syndrome"). Likewise, testimony has been permitted on
"sexual abuse accommodation syndrome" to explain a child's delay in reporting the
abuse. See, e.g., United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1990)
(permitting expert testimony about the general behavioral characteristics exhibited
by children who have been sexually abused because it assisted the jury in under-
standing the evidence).
" 676 F. Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1988).
3 Id. at 354; see also United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451, 1458 (10th Cir.
1985).
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for recovered memory testimony and for psychologically orient-
ed offers of expert proof in general. Broadly speaking, expert
testimony must constitute "scientific knowledge" for it to be
capable of assisting the jury." Under the standard enunciated
in Frye v. United States,39 and adopted by the courts of many
jurisdictions, expert testimony is inadmissible unless the scien-
tific technique on which it is based has won "general accep-
tance" in the relevant scientific community.4" This exacting
standard is no longer applicable to trials in federal court,41
and has fallen into disfavor elsewhere as well;42 nevertheless
all courts still require some sort of demonstration that the
scientific technique can be tested for accuracy, and that it is, in
fact, an accurate indicator of the variable it is supposed to
measure.
43
Repressed memory, by its very nature, does not lend itself
to empirical assessment. The traumatic event supposedly being
remembered will usually have occurred in private, with no
witness other than the alleged perpetrator himself, who will
have every reason to deny that the event being reported ever
occurred." Thus, the person claiming to have recovered a re-
pressed memory generally will be the sole source of informa-
tion available to anyone studying the phenomenon, and, ac-
cordingly, the type of statistical or experimental methodology
we ordinarily think of as constituting the "scientific method"
38 See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786,
2795 (1993) (construing FED. R. EVID. 702).
39 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
' Id. at 1014.
4' Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 (Frye test superseded by the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
42 See, e.g., People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827, 828-29, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 560
N.Y.S.2d 115 (1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting) (questioning whether Frye test should
apply to all types of proposed expert testimony). See generally 1 MCCORMICK, su-
pra note 30, at 871.
' In Daubert, the Court suggested some of the criteria that a court should
consider in determining whether a proposed subject of expert testimony constitutes
"scientific knowledge:" whether the theory can be and has been tested, i.e., wheth-
er the theory is capable of refutation; whether the theory has been subjected to
peer review or publication; whether the theory (or technique) has a known or po-
tential rate of error; and, finally, whether there has been general acceptance in
the relevant community. 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
" One of the peculiarities of the case reported by Wright, supra note 8, was
the willingness of the accused father to confess to a panoply of acts he had not
committed.
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BOOK REVIEW
will be impossible to utilize. What is known about repressed
memory comes overwhelmingly from the work of psychothera-
pists, but, as one court has observed, "Psychology and psychia-
try are imprecise disciplines. Unlike the biological sciences,
their methods of investigation are primarily subjective and
most of their findings are not based on physically observable
evidence."45 Therapists listen to what their clients tell them,
they ask more or less probing questions, they offer their clients
interpretations and gauge their clients' responses and, over
time, they develop a sense of when to trust the accuracy of
what each particular client reports. Over the course of seeing
many clients, they develop hypotheses about the types of sto-
ries that are likely to be true. Undeniably, the hypotheses
derived constitute a form of knowledge, but not necessarily a
form of knowledge congruent with the requirements of the
judicial system, i.e., "scientific knowledge."46
'" Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226, 229 (Wash. 1986). In Tyson, the Washington
Supreme Court held that the discovery rule did not apply to intentional tort
claims in which the delay in filing suit during the applicable limitation period was
alleged to be due to repressed memory. As the court also observed, 'The purpose
of emotional therapy is not the determination of historical facts, but the contempo-
rary treatment and cure of the patient. We cannot expect these professions to
answer questions they were not intended to address." Id.; see also Louisiana v.
Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1125 (La. 1993) ("[P]sychodynamic theories on the explana-
tion of human behavior is, at best, a science that is difficult to impossible to test
for accuracy. . . Thus, the key question of testability in determining whether a
technique is valid enough for admissibility cannot be conclusively answered."); New
Hampshire v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 699 (N.H. 1993) ("[Ihe separate fields of
behavioral science and criminal justice are different enough in their foundations
and goals that what may be considered helpful information in one may not be so
valued in the other. Generally speaking, the psychological evaluation of a child
suspected of being sexually abused is, at best, an inexact science. . . . [and] does
not present the verifiable results and logical conclusions that work to ensure the
reliability required in the solemn matter of a criminal trial.").
"6 One outspoken critic of psychoanalysis-the form of psychotherapy associated
with Freud and his followers-has characterized the discipline as a "pseudoscience"
and has listed among its "anti-empirical features:"
its casually anecdotal approach to corroboration; its cavalier dismissal of
its most besetting epistemic problem, that of suggestion; . . . its penchant
for generalizing from a small number of imperfectly examined instances;
its proliferation of theoretical entities bearing no testable referents; . ..
its ambiguities and exit clauses, allowing negative results to be counted
as positive ones; . . . its absence of any specified means for preferring
one interpretation to another; its insistence that only the initiated are
entitled to criticize; [and] its stigmatization of disagreement as "resis-
tance," along with the corollary that, as Freud put it, all resistance con-
stitutes "actual evidence in favor of the correctness" of the theory.
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It is one thing for psychologists to be permitted to testify
that the phenomenon of repressed memory occurs; on that
proposition, there is general acceptance in the scientific com-
munity, and the testimony can be useful in dispelling the natu-
ral doubts of the lay jury. It is another thing, however, for ex-
pert witnesses to be permitted to identify the differing sign-
posts of "true" memories and "false" memories. As indicated
earlier, there is no general agreement on how to tell whether a
memory is true or false; thus, if such testimony is permitted, a
jury in a case involving repressed memory generally will hear
two discrepant opinions-one in support of the eyewitness, the
other opposed to the eyewitness-but will not have at its dis-
posal any rational basis for evaluating those opinions.47
Expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome or other conditions beyond the ken of
the average juror, when allowed, generally is admitted solely
on the issue of the complainant's credibility, and not to prove
that the crime, in fact, occurred.4" So, too, in the George
Franklin prosecution, the court, rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment that the prosecution's proposed expert testimony did not
meet the standards of reliability for scientific evidence, permit-
ted expert testimony on "the nature of memory, the mecha-
nisms of repression, and the process of the retrieval of lost
memories." But the court would not permit the experts on
either side to state an opinion on whether Eileen Franklin's
memory of the Nason murder was, in fact, a repressed memo-
ry, or if it was a repressed memory, whether it was a true or
false one.49 Thus, this testimony merely was supposed to sup-
ply the jury with the tools to determine whether Eileen
Crews, supra note 17, at 62 & n.20.
47 A related problem is whether a court should even permit a fact witness to
testify regarding memories recovered as a result of psychotherapy. Courts have
been fairly uniform in holding that witnesses may not testify about posthypnotic
recollections because hypnosis, depending so heavily on suggestion, is not a reli-
able method for restoring memory. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453
N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983) (thoroughly discussing the reliability issues
involved with posthypnotic recollections). Psychotherapy, too, may involve large
doses of suggestion, which may be particularly problematic when the clients are
children. But adults, too, are susceptible to suggestion. See supra notes 9 & 26.
" See People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 292, 552 N.E.2d 131, 138, 552 N.Y.S.2d
883, 890 (1990).
" MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 344-45.
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Franklin's "believable but still rather incredible story" was
true.5" But how was the jury supposed to do that, if the jury
itself lacked the expertise possessed by the experts?
Consider, by way of rough analogy, what it would be like
to be the trier of fact in a case turning on the meaning of
words in a foreign language. Suppose the issue in the case
were: What is written in the first book of The Iliad? Suppose,
further, that in this adversary proceeding, each side presented
a scholar of ancient Greek-an expert witness-to provide a
translation for the non-Greek-speaking jury, and suppose the
translations had little in common. Lacking any proficiency in
the language itself, the jury would be in the position of having
to decide the ultimate question-the content of the text-by
deciding which scholar to believe; that is, by evaluating the
credibility of the experts.
In a case involving repressed memory, the jury will hear
from the accusing witness himself or herself, and perhaps will
be able to form some tentative judgment about the witness's
general credibility; presumably, though, the jury will need the
assistance of experts to evaluate the validity of the memory at
the heart of the accusation. And here, too, as with the non-
Greek-speaking jury, the trier of fact will lack the "lan-
guage"-the body of specialized, psychological knowl-
edge-necessary for evaluating the hypotheses of the experts
on their merits. Accordingly, in a case hinging on the credibili-
ty of the accusing witness, the jury will have to assess that
witness's credibility by assessing the credibility of the experts.
As Mr. MacLean argues, the testimony of the prosecution's
expert was "essential" to the prosecution's case; 1 as he dem-
onstrates, that testimony and the corresponding defense testi-
mony could scarcely have been more different.
III. THE "REPRESSED MEMORIES" OF EILEEN FRANKLIN
On direct examination, Eileen Franklin testified that on
September 22, 1969, when she was eight years old, she was
with her father in his van; they saw Eileen's friend, Susan
'0 Id. at 346.
rl Id.
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Nason, and Eileen's father stopped to pick Susan up." There
was a mattress in the back of the van, Eileen stated, and she
and Susan, who wore a dress, white socks, and brown shoes,
bounced on the mattress as her father drove.53 At some point,
the van stopped and Eileen moved to the front seat; her father
moved to the mattress, and Eileen saw him rape Susan.54
Next, Eileen testified, she, her friend and her father all left the
van.55 She saw her father approach Susan with a rock held
over his head.56 Susan's eyes met Eileen's and Susan's arms
flew up in an effort to protect herself.57 Eileen looked away,
she heard two blows and next she saw Susan's bloody, lifeless
body.58 She ran screaming toward the van, but her father
grabbed her, told her she would have to forget what had hap-
pened-because people would blame her for letting her friend
get in the van-and threatened to kill her if she told anyone
what she had seen.59 Then, Eileen testified, she saw her fa-
ther discard the mattress and arrange rocks around Susan's
body to make it look like she had fallen.6" From that moment
on, she had no memory of the crime.61
After testifying about the crime, Eileen testified about the
violence perpetrated by her father against all of his children.62
Then, she described two occasions when she had been sexually
abused by her father; the first time when she was five years
old, and the second time when she was seven.63 She followed
with testimony about an incident when she had been nine or
ten when her father held her down while her godfather raped
her.6'
Finally, Eileen Franklin described how she had come to
recover the memory of the murder, twenty years after the fact.
52 Id. at 294.
-3 Id.
14 MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 294-95.
5' Id. at 296.
5' Id. at 297.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 298.
60 Id.
61 MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 323.
62 Id. at 299.
6 Id. at 301.
64 Id. at 302; see also id. at 253.
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She stated that she had been sitting on her sofa when her
daughter, playing on the floor in front of her, had asked her a
question." Something about the way her eyes connected with
her daughter's brought to mind the way her eyes had met
Susan Nason's as her father stood over Susan with a rock
above his head.66 Eileen testified that once she had recovered
the image of her father with the rock, more details came back
to her, randomly, over the succeeding months." She had re-
sisted these memories and, in fact, had wondered how they
were possible.6" Ultimately, however, she had confided in her
therapist, Kirk Barrett, who had told her to trust and believe
in her recollections, and not to be afraid, because she had sur-
vived the traumas of her past.69
On direct examination, the prosecutor brought out some of
the weaknesses in Eileen's story, in an effort to have her ex-
plain them away; on cross-examination, the defense attorney
zeroed in on these weaknesses, which were distributed over
every area of Eileen's testimony: her memory of the murder,
her memory of the defendant's sexual violence against her and
her account of the return of her memory. With respect to the
murder, Eileen admitted to numerous changes in her recollec-
tion:
originally her father was drinking beer, but that got dropped from
the story; originally she thought she saw Susan carrying something
in her hand, but that also was dropped; she told Etter [an investiga-
tor with the district attorney's office] that Susan was wearing a
lavender or blue sweater, but that has disappeared; originally there
was no dress, but now there is one; originally there was no rock on
the body, now there is one; originally there were no shoes, now she
remembers her father throwing one or two.7"
Eileen's memory also changed regarding whether her sister,
Janice, had been in the van when they had picked up Susan;71
the location of the murder had changed;72 and the time of day
" MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 304.
es Id.
67 Id.
"8 Id.
E9 Id.
70 MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 328.
71 Id. at 294, 317-18.
72 Id. at 320.
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had changed from morning to afternoon.73 With respect to the
sexual abuse, as it came out, Eileen Franklin's memories of
these incidents, too, had been repressed; the incident when she
was seven was only recovered some twenty years later,74 and
the rape, also, underwent a startling transformation-origi-
nally, the perpetrator had been black, but eventually, he had
revealed himself to have been her godfather, a white man.75
And last, Eileen's account of how she came to remember the
murder was inconsistent: she admitted having told her brother
and mother that her memory had resurfaced as a result of
hypnosis.76 Additionally, she was confronted with the state-
ments of various people to whom she had spoken about her re-
covered memory; each statement contained a different account
of the memory's return.77
This, then, was the messy testimony the jury had to as-
sess-testimony rich in contradictions from a psychologically
damaged witness with a powerful motive to testify falsely
against her persecutor.7" A jury confronted with such testimo-
ny in an ordinary case, involving recent events, would be ex-
pected to reject it. But as the prosecution hoped to show
through its expert, the testimony's apparent weaknesses in
actuality proved its truth.
The prosecution expert, Dr. Lenore Terr, had unimpeach-
able credentials: she was a professor of psychiatry, the author
of dozens of articles and a specialist in the field of childhood
trauma and the type of memory created by such trauma.7"
Although Dr. Terr was not permitted to testify that she be-
lieved Eileen's story," she was able to say as much indirectly,
by correlating the facts of Eileen's life and account of the mur-
der with her own hypotheses regarding repression in trauma
victims. For example, Dr. Terr said, repression could be
73 Id. at 299.
7' MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 312, 315.
75 Id. at 303, 327-28.
76 Id. at 304, 314. Had that been the case, her testimony would have been
inadmissible under California law. Id. at 156-57; see CAL. EVID. CODE § 795 (West
1966).
7 MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 324.
7 Additionally, she had committed herself to book and movie deals in which
she would be paid for telling her story. Id. at 328-29.
79 Id. at 346.
80 Id. at 348.
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brought on by a "'loyalty conflict' in which somebody threatens
you with what will happen if you remember; the shame and
guilt over feeling that you were an accomplice to the terror; the
'gore' of the event; [and] the failure of a third party to talk to
the child shortly after the event.""'
Tipton [the prosecutor] poses a hypothetical question which matches
Eileen's story perfectly: If a child is subjected to one hideous, violent
act coupled with a death threat in the midst of a childhood filled
with physical and sexual abuse by a parental figure, would the sin-
gle act be repressed? It most likely would be, Terr responds.82
Similarly, Dr. Terr's testimony with respect to the condi-
tions under which a repressed memory is recovered closely
paralleled Eileen's testimony. A repressed memory would be
more likely to resurface, Dr. Terr stated, if, among other
things, a person had children of roughly the same age as the
person was at the time of the trauma, and if the person were
in therapy.' The memory might well be triggered by seeing
someone in a similar posture or position to a person who par-
ticipated in the forgotten event." Dr. Terr further testified
that when a repressed memory returns, initially there is often
a flood of images, followed thereafter by a continual trickle of
details.85 But some details of the event may never be filled
in.8" Nonetheless, Dr. Terr asserted, "the fact that the memo-
ry has been repressed may actually enhance its accuracy."87
On the subject of differentiating a false recovered memory
from a true one, Dr. Terr was quite confident of her ability to
do so, notwithstanding that no controlled studies of the subject
were possible.88 She enumerated the three factors she consid-
ered dispositive: the rememberer's symptoms, the level of de-
tail of the memory and the level of emotion accompanying the
rememberer's reporting of the memory. 9 In the case of a true
memory, during the period of repression, the event causing
81 Id.
82 Id.
8Id.
'Id.
85 MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 349.
88 Id.
8 Id. at 350.
88 Id. at 355.
89 Id.
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that repression would have manifested itself in destructive
ideation or behavior; ° when the true memory returned, it
would be rich in detail, and the person reporting the memory
would be much affected by the telling."1 Thus, after hearing
Dr. Terr's testimony, the jury had a rational basis for believing
Eileen. She fit the profile of a memory repressor, and her
memory had returned in the manner of a true memory.
But the testimony of the defense expert, Dr. David Spiegel,
a highly-decorated psychiatry professor with credentials equal
to Dr. Terr's,92 told a thoroughly different story. For example,
according to Dr. Spiegel, it was extremely difficult to tell a
false memory from a true one, particularly when the memory
concerned ancient events. 3 The older the memory, Dr. Spiegel
believed, the more likely it was to combine fact and fantasy:
"when events are kept out of awareness and kept unconscious,
there's certainly opportunity for transformation of the events
to occur."94 However, in the case of a true recovered memory,
the details were not likely to change, and it was unusual for
remembered details to be discarded, "because the memory, in a
sense, leaps back into consciousness rather than it being a
kind of process of accretion."" Whereas Dr. Terr had implicit-
ly indicated that the physical and psychological abuse Eileen
had undergone validated her recovered memory, Dr. Spiegel
believed that the opposite was true; he testified that memories
could be influenced by suggestion; that people who have suf-
fered traumas are more suggestible than people who have not;
and that people who have suffered repeated traumas are likely
to interpret later events through the prism of the earlier trau-
mas.9" All of these premises led Dr. Spiegel to the conclusion
that persons, such as Eileen, who had suffered "repeated trau-
matic experiences might be more likely to have.., false
memor[ies]."
On several other points, Dr. Spiegel disagreed with Dr.
'o See supra text accompanying note 12.
, MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 349.
92 Id. at 390.
93 Id. at 392, 394.
94 Id. at 392, 395.
95Id. at 394.
" MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 392.
97 Id. at 392.
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Terr. He disagreed that, by looking at a person's symptoms,
one could reliably deduce the nature of the trauma that had
caused these symptoms: "As psychiatrists, we do much better
reasoning forward than backward.""8 He disputed that a
memory was any more likely to be true when it had been re-
covered in response to a specific triggering stimulus.9 And he
posited that an abused child might well have a distorted per-
spective on external events: blaming herself for the acts perpe-
trated against her, the child might also place herself "at the
center of stories that occur outside the home as well."100
Thus, Dr. Spiegel's testimony implied, having been marginally
associated with Susan's death-since Susan had been her
friend-Eileen might have come to believe that she was "the
center and author of that event [the murder] which also in-
volve[d] her abuser. "10' So, whereas Dr. Terr had posited, in
effect, that Eileen's guilt over her "participation" in the murder
had made her repress her memory of it, Dr. Spiegel in effect
theorized that Eileen's guilt over other incidents had
transformed itself into a fantasy of participation in the mur-
der. 0
2
Thus, the upshot of Dr. Spiegel's testimony was that one
can never be certain, absent corroborating evidence, of the
truth of a repressed memory,' but that, with a person such
as Eileen Franklin, the uncertainties should be resolved
against her. How, then, in considering the ultimate question of
Eileen's credibility, was the jury to choose between the compet-
ing theories of these well-matched adversaries? As Mr.
MacLean describes their respective performances on the wit-
ness stand, the validity of their theories aside, Dr. Terr was
the far more effective witness: "Rather than the predictable
heavy countenance of the self-important intellectual,... she
" Id. at 393.
" Id.
10 Id. at 392-93.
... MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 392-93.
1" The defense presented another expert, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, an experimental
psychologist. Id. at 398. She testified about studies she had conducted indicating
that memories are highly susceptible to suggestion; that older memories are espe-
cially vulnerable to distortion; and that people are not very good at separating
their actual memories from later-acquired information. Id. at 399. But her research
involved "normal" memories, not recovered ones. Id.
103 Id. at 394.
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display[ed] an open, pleasant smile and an easy self-confi-
dence." 1 4 She testified in a "folksy, down-home manner,""5
and illustrated her theories with interesting examples from her
clinical experience. She provided "mesmeriz[ing]," "superb en-
tertainment." 6 Dr. Spiegel, on the other hand, came across
as a classic academic, and during his testimony, authoritative
but boring, he had one of the most attentive jurors
yawning. 1
7
If Terr was bad science and good theater, Spiegel is good science and
bad theater. Spiegel... speaks as though he were in a lecture hall.
There are no anecdotes, no stories, ... no encounters with famous
authors to illustrate his points and enthrall his audience."8
To the extent, then, that the outcome of the case depended on
the expert testimony, the prosecution won, Mr. MacLean sug-
gests, because the jury liked its expert more.
To be sure, Mr. MacLean does not insist that George
Franklin was convicted because of Dr. Terr's testimony. As the
author shows, despite the best efforts of Franklin's very able
attorney, Douglas Horngrad, just about every discretionary
evidentiary ruling that could have gone against the defendant
did go against him. Particularly shattering was the trial
judge's ruling permitting a girlfriend of the defendant to testify
about his sexual proclivities, as well as permitting Eileen to
testify about the physical and sexual abuse she had suf-
fered.0 9 And in a case in which the prosecution went to great
lengths to demonstrate that Eileen's memory of the murder
had to be accurate because the details she recalled were cor-
roborated by physical and forensic evidence only an eyewitness
I" Id. at 346.
,01 Id. at 347.
100 MACLEAN, supra note 1, at 347-56.
107 Id. at 394.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 252-57, 260-61. As Mr. MacLean argues, the sexual abuse evidence
went a long way
to . . . excuse what should have been Eileen's tremendous failings as a
witness .... all of the lying and instability was understandable, perhaps
predictable, because of what her father had done to her .... [Tihe un-
charged conduct evidence provided Eileen with the cloak of victimhood,
and that cloak immunized her from the effects of her lying and constant-
ly shifting and changing stories.
Id. at 471-72.
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could have been aware of, the trial court severely undercut the
defense by excluding evidence proving that all of the corrobo-
rating information had been well-publicized at the time of the
murder in 1969.11° These factors, rather than the expert testi-
mony, well may have been decisive in the prosecution of
George Franklin.11'
Nevertheless, it is not hard to envision a prosecution based
on a recovered memory in which the defendant is not the gro-
tesque individual Franklin was, and in which there is neither
a record of prior bad acts nor corroborating evidence of the
crime itself. The lack of such evidence of course would not
necessarily indicate that the complaining witness was either
lying or mistaken, but it would make the competing expert
witnesses-if their testimony were permitted-all the more
important. Whenever a trial depends on the resolution of an
esoteric issue beyond the experience and knowledge of the
average juror, the jury is likely to find itself having to choose
between the discrepant hypotheses of experts without any
acceptable method for making the choice. This would be no less
true in a civil trial involving late-twentieth-century physics
than in a criminal trial involving repressed memory. In the
former instance, however, the parties at least will have the
option of resolving their dispute outside the judicial sys-
tem-before, for example, a tribunal of experts. In the latter
instance, the defendant will have no such option, and he may
wind up in jail-and, possibly, on death row. Among the merits
of Once Upon A Time-and it is a well researched, easily read-
able and fascinating account of the Franklin trial-is that it
highlights the dangers inherent in any trial in which psycho-
logical notions of truth must be reconciled with the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
110 Id. at 412-13.
I" In April 1993, the defendant's conviction was affirmed. Court Affirms Convic-
tion Based on Repressed Memory, SACRAMiENTO BEE, Apr. 6, 1993, at B5. On June
15, 1993, the California Supreme Court declined to review the matter further.
Court Won't Review Conviction of Man in 1969 Rape-Murder, SACRAMENTO BEE,
July 16, 1993, at B4. In April 1994, George Franklin filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking
a new trial. New Trial Sought in Revived Memory Case, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr.
27, 1994, at B4.
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